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JIM CROW'S LONG GOODBYE
Gabriel J. Chin*

I. INTRODUCfiON

Most judicial discussions of affirmative action and racial justice are unsatisfying because they omit a fundamental category
of evidence: Information which would provide a basis for evaluating the scope of Jim Crow and its systematic consequences.
Some assessment of the entirety of the institution is necessary to
have an informed view of whether Jim Crow has been eliminated. While there is much scholarship, legislative history and
jurisprudence about particular issues such as school segregation
or racial disenfranchisement, especially at specific times and
places, there is apparently no source which makes it possible to
analyze the scope of racial discrimination through law and custom over time on a national level. There is no source, for example, identifying all of the school systems in the United States that
were segregated by law or custom, no reference listing even the
largest governmental agencies and corporations known to have
practiced formal racial discrimination in employment.
The absence of systematic factual information and the consequent necessity of over-reliance on intuition are significant because the Supreme Court and its justices often explore the question of whether it is time to declare that they have put America's
race problem behind them. In exploring these questions, the jus-
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tices seem to believe that a level playing field is both important
and legally significant.
In Grutter v. Bollinger, 1 a majority of the Court concluded
that the promised land had not yet been reached. The majority
approved an affirmative action program at the University of
Michigan Law School; in a series of opinions, every member of
the Court addressed the question of when affirmative action
would be unnecessary. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the majority noted that:
It has been 25 years since Justice Powell first approved the

use of race to further an interest in student body diversity in
the context of public higher education. Since that time, the
number of minority applicants with high grades and test
scores has indeed increased .... We expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary
to further the interest approved today?

Whatever the actual underlying rationale for this forecast, 3 the
Court's prediction rests on the idea that within 25 years, a sufficiently racially diverse student body will be achieved through
ordinary sorting and application processes. When that happens,
the decades of debate about the permissibility of affirmative action and the rationales for it will become moot; affirmative action will not be justified as a means of remedying past discrimination, because it will have been remedied, and it will not be
justified as a means of achieving diversity because diversity will
result automatically, just as it does, for example, with respect to
Asian Americans, Italian Americans, and those of the Jewish
faith.
Although the perspectives of the concurring and dissenting
opinions were quite different, they shared with the majority the
explicit or implicit premises that race-neutrality is desirable, that
the nation is moving towards racial fairness and that judges can
I. 53Y U.S. 306 (2003).
2. !d. at 343 (citation omitted).
3. As Dean Kevin Johnson cogently observed, the timetable is surprising in the
context of a decision upholding diversity as a compelling state interest. "If a diverse student body is the justification for affirmative action, it is uncertain why the law would require a time limit." Kevin Johnson, The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action? 21
CONST. COMMENT. 150 (2004). That is, there is no reason to assume that diversity will
not be as desirable in a century or millennium as it is now. If diversity is the true rationale for the Court's decision, then the time limit does not at first blush make an enormous
amount of sense, and Dean Johnson is right that the Court's language contains the possibility of sympathy to the idea that the real justification for the program, and a legitimate
one. is remedying past discrimination.
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tell when (or that) the nation has achieved equal opportunity.
Justice Thomas's dissent quoted Frederick Douglas, who argued
for nothing more or less than equitable treatment: "'What I ask
for the negro is not benevolence, not pity, not sympathy, but
simply justice."' 4
Justice Ginsburg argued that the legacy of past discrimination was too weighty either to declare victory now, or even toestablish any particular time limit:
As lower school education in minority communities improves,
an increase [in minority students with high grades and test
scores] may be anticipated. From today's vantage point, one
may hope, but not firmly forecast, that over the next generation's span, progress toward nondiscrimination and genuinely
equal opportunity will make it safe to sunset affirmative action.5

The opinions rest on the core value of equal opportunity, which
seems to be the "justice" desired by Justice Thomas, as well as
the engine of the increased grades and test scores predicted in
Justice O'Connor's opinion, and hoped for in Justice Ginsburg's.
Judicial evaluation of the development of African Americans in the context of the larger society is part of a long judicial
tradition. In 1883, in the Civil Rights Cases, 6 the Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to state action, and
thus that Congress had no power to prohibit private discrimination. They were also exasperated with undue congressional concern for special rights for African American:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of
his elevation when he takes the rank of mere citizen, and
ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his
rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected by the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are protected. 7

4. !d. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Frederick Douglass,
What the Black Man Wants: An Address Delivered in Boston, Massachusetts, on 26
January 1865, reprinted in 4 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 59, 68 (J. Blassingame
& J. McKivigan eds., 1991)) (emphasis in original).
5. !d. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
6. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
7. !d. at 25. Justice Harlan proposed that it was "scarcely just to say that the colored race has been the special favorite of the laws." !d. at61 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 8 Justice
Blackmun voted for affirmative action with simultaneous conviction and regret:
I yield to no one in my earnest hope that the time will come
when an "affirmative action" program is unnecessary and is,
in truth, only a relic of the past. I would hope that we could
reach this stage within a decade at the most. But the story of
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), decided
almost a guarter of a century ago, suggests that that hope is a
slim one. 9

Again, although the conclusions differed, a century apart, both
opinions reflected confidence that the "stage" of African American progress could be reliably determined. However, they support their conclusions primarily with judicial decisions, which,
even if not quite random, cannot be assembled to create an accurate picture of the world.
Judges could not base their decisions on systematic analyses
of Jim Crow because there are no systematic analyses of Jim Crow.
For example, we know there was segregation in the schools, but
there is no single source identifying the school districts in this country practicing unconstitutional racial segregation and what happened in those school districts after Brown v. Board of Education.
We know African Americans used to be excluded from all jobs or
good jobs at some institutions, but there is no catalog of the major
corporate and governmental employers who refused to hire African Americans and when those policies ended. We know African Americans and others used to be denied the right to purchase property in particular areas through racially restrictive
covenants in real estate documents, but there is no national calculation of the prevalence of restrictive covenants and their effects on African American housing patterns and African American wealth creation. We know African Americans used to be
denied the right to serve on juries in criminal and civil cases, but
there is no estimate of the number of verdicts that might have
been affected by this discrimination, or their economic and other
consequences. We know that laws were passed to harm members
of particular races, but there has been no effort to identify the
laws still on the books designed to promote racial separation or
deny African Americans equal opportunity.

8.
9.

438 U.S. 265 (1978).
!d. at 403 (Btackmun, J.).
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There are two major implications of the absence of this type
of evidence. First, there has never been a formal national project
to eliminate the structure and effects of racial discrimination the
way there has been, for example, to eliminate polio or provide a
national highway system. Such a project would be impossible
without reliable information about the scope of racial discrimination. In the absence of a conscious, systematic effort to eliminate the vestiges of past discrimination it is much less likely that
it will happen. Second, there has been no calculation of the national effects of racial discrimination, how society at any point
differs from how it would have looked in the absence of discrimination. Again, such a calculation is impossible in the absence of systematic information about the scope of racial discrimination.
Part II of this essay examines one of the most heavily studied and litigated aspects of Jim Crow, the state legislative response to Brown v. Board of Education, and shows that much of
the statutory effort to evade Brown in the former Confederate
states remains on the books, some of it in ways that could be
used to discriminate on the basis of race now. 10 Part III explores
some of the implications of the fact that large portions of the
states' efforts to defy the Constitution remain on the books. 11
The essay concludes by proposing a comprehensive study of racially discriminatory laws and policies in the United States in order to make it possible for policymakers and the public to analyze the legacy of racial discrimination or lack thereof. 12
II. JIM CROW LAWS ON THE BOOKS TODAY
Perusal of the codes of laws 13 of the States of the Union
shows that fifty years after Brown, Jim Crow has not gone away.
Various Jim Crow measures, and in particular a significant fraction of the statutes enacted to derail integration, remain in the
statutes or constitutions of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Missis-

10.
11.
12.

See notes 13-74, infra, and accompanying text.
See notes 75-118, infra, and accompanying text.
See notes 119-126, infra, and accompanying text.

13. The information in this section is drawn from the report of the Jim Crow Study
Group at the University of Arizona. See Still on the Books: Jim Crow and Segregation
Laws Fifty Years After Brown v. Board of Education, 6 RUTGERS RACE & L. REv.
(forthcoming 2004). As this article was going to press, some of the statutes cited in this
section were in the process of repeal as a result of the information presented in the report.
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sippi, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and West
Virginia. 14
A. MASSIVE RESISTANCE TO INTEGRATION
Brown v. Board of Education's declaration that segregation
in public schools was unconstitutional stunned many white
communities in states practicing racial segregation. 15 One techniaue states used to avoid integration was simply to refuse to do
it, 1 or even violently resist it. 17 This effort was supported by
various kinds of state statutes.
A significant example of this remains on the books in Louisiana. Sub-Part G-2 of the Louisiana Statutes governing public
schools is titled "OPERATION OF SEPARATE SCHOOLS
FOR WHITE AND COLORED." 18 Section 335 governs "Salaries and emoluments of school officials during federal integra-

14.

A number of sources explore various aspects of the southern legal response to

Brown. See NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950s (1969); THOMAS EMERSON, ET AL.,
POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 1252-99 (1967); HARRELL
RODGERS & CHARLES BULLOCK, COERCION TO COMPLIANCE (1976); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE
(1991 ); Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 193 (1964); Davison M. Douglas, The Rhetoric of Moderation:
Desegregating the South During the Decade After Brown, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 92 (1994);
Helen Hershkoff & Adam S. Cohen, School Choice and the Lessons of Choctaw County,
10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (1992); Wendy Parker, The Future Of School Desegregation,
94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157 (2000); Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE
L.J. 1436 (1973) [hereinafter "Segregation Academies"]; Note, The Federal Courts and
Integration of the Southern Schools: Troubled Status of the Pupil Placement Acts, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (1962).
\5. A statement suggesting the importance of racial segregation to some is contained in a unanimous decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court affirming the convictions of a group of freedom riders:
Segregation in schools and in all means of public transportation has been
declared at an end by judicial fiat. The cry by certain groups for conformity to
their beliefs rings out endlessly over the land through the various media of
communications. Large numbers of people, in this broad land, arc steeped in
their customs, practices, mores and traditions. In many instances, their beliefs
go as deep or deeper than religion itself. If, in the lapse of time, these principles,
sacred to them, shall be disproved, then it may be accepted that truth will prevail. But, until those principles have been tested in the crucible of time, no abject surrender should be expected, much less demanded.
Knight v. State, 161 So. 2d 521,523 (Miss. 1964).
16. See EMERSON, supra note 14, at 1264-68 (discussing violent resistance to Brown
and legal doctrines of "nullification" and "interposition" used to justify non-compliance
with federal constitutional principles deemed objectionable by particular states).
17. For an excellent account of physical governmental resistance to federal court
orders, sec WILLIAM DOYLE, AN AMERICAN INSURRECTION: JAMES MEREDITH AND
THE BA TILE OF OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI (2001 ).
18. LA. REV. STAT. T. 17, Ch. 1, Pt. III, Subpt. G-2.
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tion action," and provides that salaries shall continue to be paid
"during time necessarily spent by such person away from his
normal duties as a consequence of federal action relatin._p to integration of the races in the public schools of Louisiana." 1
Louisiana teachers would be paid not only when they were
away from their duties to participate "in a proceeding before a
federal court, board, commission or officer," but also when absence resulted because the teacher's support of segregated
schools led to their being "imprisoned or confined pursuant to
an order or judgment of a federal court." 20 Thus, teachers could
count on state support if held in contempt for disobeying federal
injunctions or even if indicted, convicted and sentenced for
criminal participation in violent resistance.
B. CLOSING PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Another method of finessing Brown was to close the public
schools? 1 The statutes of Louisiana22 grant the governor the discretion to close the schools temporarily. If the governor invokes
this authority, "and after a reasonable time determines that all
the schools may not be reopened and operated on a racially se§regated basis, he may declare the schools permanently closed." 3
This statute is in Louisiana's code even though it was declared
unconstitutional over 40 years ago by a three judge U.S. District
Court in a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court. 24 Another
statutory system providing for closing the schools following a
referendum was only partially repealed even though it was held
unconstitutional in 1961. 25 The school closings of Arkansas 26 and
19. LA. REV. STAT.§ 17:335(a).
20. /d.
21. See EMERSON, supra note 14, at 1273-74 (discussing school closing as a means of
resisting Brown); School Closing Plans, 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 807 (1958).
22. LA. REV. STAT. § 17:171 (governor's authority to close schools); LA. REV.
STAT. § 17:349.1-.5 (governor's authority to take over and temporarily or permanently
close schools); see also LA. REV. STAT.§ 17:172 (prohibiting operation of school other
thao: in accordance with state policy); LA. REV. STAT.§ 17:173 (denying promotion and
graduation to any students attending class "where the class has been made subject to any
order not consistent with the Constitution and laws of the state"); LA. REV. STAT. §
17:429; LA. REV. STAT. § 17:430 (providing for revocation of teaching certificates for
teaching a class "in violation of the Constitution or laws of this state").
23. LA. REV. STAT.§ 17:349.2(0).
24. Bush v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916, 930 (E.D. La. 1960) (three
judge court) ("this court ... declares [inter alia] Act ... 12, 14, 23, 24 ... of the First Extraordinary Session of 1960 unconstitutional. This court will prepare the decree enjoining
their enforcement"), affd mem. per curiam, 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
25. LA. REV. STAT.§§ 350.2-350.14 (held unconstitutional in Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961) (three judge court), affd mem. per curiam,
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Virginia 27 were also invalidated. 28 Nevertheless, Georgia 29 and
Mississippi, 30 like Louisiana, also still have laws on the books
dating to the era of massive resistance authorizing the governor
to close educational institutions. There is no apparent reason
these statutes could not be used today.
C. REPEALING COMPULSORY A TIENDANCE LAWS.

Closing schools created difficulty because state law required
school attendance of children of a certain age. 32 Many segregated states changed their laws to relax or eliminate this requirement to facilitate school closing. In February, 1959, Governor Almond of Virginia gave a speech addressing his proposed
responses to the "unholy alliance of a conspiracy to destroy the
Constitution" represented by Brown; 33 he noted that "no parent
or guardian is under any legal compulsion from any source to
send a child to a racially mixed school, " 34 and as one of 11 ideas
for preventing race-mixing proposed to "take a more thorough
look at the statutes of our compulsory attendance laws." 35 He
closed his speech by reminding the legislature that he "pledged
368 U.S. 515 (1962)).
26. Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (three judge court) (per
curiam), affd mem. per curiam sub nom. Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959).
27. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). See R.C. SMITH, THEY CLOSED
THEIR SCHOOLS: PRI:-ICE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 1951-1964 (1965).
28. But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971) (allowing city to close recreational facilities based on claim that they could not be operated on profitably on an integrated basis).
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-3-70 (governor may close school when "continued operation of any such school or institution or any branch or department thereof is likely to result in or cause violence or public disorder in the community in which such school is situated or that it is necessary to preserve the good order, peace, and dignity of the state or
any subdivision thereof "). Georgia successfully used this statute to delay integration;
Judge Hooper refused to enforce his earlier desegregation order for fear that "such Order of the Court could have no effect except to close the Atlanta schools and risk the
danger of all of Georgia's schools being closed." Calhoun v. Latimer, 188 F. Supp. 412,
413 (N.D. Ga. 1960).
30. MISS. STAT. ANN.* 37-65-1 (governor may close schools when it is in "the best
interest of a majority of the educable children of any public school district" or when
"such closure will promote or preserve the public peace, order, or tranquility of such district or districts").
32. Charles K. Woltz, Compulsory Attendance at School, 20 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
3 (1955).
33. Address of Governor J. Lindsay Almond Jr. to a Special Session of the Virginia
General Assembly on January 28, 1959, reprimed in 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 183, 183
(I 959).
34. /d. at 186.
35. /d. at 187.
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to the people of Virginia that I would resist with every resource
at my command that which I know to be wrong and would destroy eve~ rational semblance of effective public education in
Virginia." 6
On March 31, 1959, the Commission on Education ap37
pointed by the Governor issued its report. As to Brown, they
explained: "Never before had the court rendered a decision so
drastically invading the right of the states to manage their internal affairs." 38 One of the measures proposed was to provide that
"any child may, with consent of his parent or guardian, be excused from school either on recommendation of school authorities and the juvenile judge or on recommendation of the Superintendent of Public Instruction." 39 It became law and remains on
the books. 40 This statute allowed the authorities to excuse white
students from attending integrated schools, and to encourage
African American students to opt out of school entirely.
Georgia law also provides that the Governor may suspend
compulsory education laws "over the entire state or in any portion thereof" based on "any riot, insurrection, public disorder,
disturbance of the peace, natural calamity, or disaster. " 41 Thus, if
a mob attacked African Americans attempting to enter a formerly all white school, it could be closed.
D. FINANCIAL AID TO SEGREGATED "PRIVATE" SCHOOLS

Closing schools for white children based on actual or attempted integration would defeat integration, but at the cost of
leaving those white children without educational opportunities.
Accordingly, southern states closing public schools, or wishing to
provide white citizens an alternative to integrated public schools,
offered "massive financial aid to private segregated schools. " 42
One court explained that the laws created "a means by which
36.
37.

/d. at 188.
Education in Virginia: Report uf the Commission un Education (Mar. 31 1959),
reprinted in 4 RACE REL. L. REP. 392 (1959).
38. /d. at 392.
39. /d. at 400.
40. 1959 Va. Laws Ch. 72, § 4, codified as amended at VA. STAT.§ 22.1-254(C)(1)
("A school board may excuse from allcndance at school: On recommendation of the
principal and the division superintendent and with the wrillen consent of the parent or
guardian, any pupil who the school board determines, in accordance with regulations of
the Board of Education, cannot benefit from education at such school.").
41. GA. CODE ANN.§ 20-2-702.
42. Segregation Academies, supra note 14, at 1438; see also Wendy Parker, The
Color of Choice: Race and Charter Schools, 75 TUL. L. REV. 563,568 & n.15 (2001).
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public schools under desegregation orders may be changed to
'private' schools operated in the same way, in the same buildings, with the same furnishings, with the same money, and under
the same supervision as the public schools. "43
The Supreme Court prohibited this assistance in various
forms, 44 but these decisions were neither self-enforcing nor so
clear that they could not be evaded-perhaps the most telling
feature of these decisions is that they unfolded over decades, so
many years of support occurred before particular programs or
forms of support were halted. 45 Laws passed to support private
schools remain on the books. The Virginia Supreme Court invalidated Virginia's tuition grant program in 1955 because it violated the state constitutional prohibition on public support of
private schools;46 the constitution was then amended to allow
grants to private schools, and it continues to do so. 47 South Carolina retains its grant-in-aid statute in its current code, compiled
in 1976,48 even though the state had been permanently enjoined
from enforcing the statute in 1968 in a decision affirmed by the
Supreme Court. 49
43. Hall v. St. Helena Parish Sch. Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649,651 (E.D. La. 1961) (three
judge court), affd mem. per curiam, 368 U.S. 515 (1962).
44. See Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974) (invalidating program allowing usc of recreational facilities by segregated private schools); Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455 (1973) (invalidating Mississippi text book loan program); Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967) (three judge court) (invalidating tuition grant program), affd mem per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968); Lee v.
Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-78 (M.D. Ala.) (three judge court)
(invalidating tuition grant program), affd mem per curiam sub nom. Wallace v. United
States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); see also Griffin v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir.
1964); Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969) (three
judge court); Griffin v. Bd. of Educ., 239 F. Supp. 560 (E.D. Va. 1965) (three judge
court).
45. Compare Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (holding discriminatory private secondary schools and universities arc not entitled to tax exempt
status) with Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (individuals lack standing to challenge
IRS non-enforcement of Bob Jones holding).
46. Almond v. Day, 89 S.E.2d 851 (Va. 1955).
47. See VA. CONST. ART. VIII, § 10 ("No appropriation of public funds shall be
made to any school ... not owned or exclusively controlled by the State ... ; provided,
first, that the General Assembly may, and the governing bodies of the several counties,
cities and towns may ... , appropriate funds ... which may be expended in furtherance of
elementary, secondary, collegiate or graduate education of Virginia students in public
and nonsectarian private schools and institutions of learning, ... ").
48. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-41-20 ("Subject to the terms and provisions of this
chapter every school child in the State who has not yet finished or graduated from high
school and who desires to attend a private school located within the State shall be eligible
for and entitled to receive a State scholarship grant in an amount equal to the per pupil
cost to the State of public education as certified by the Governor.").
49. Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Ed., 296 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C.) (three-
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In 1960, the Committee on Schools of the Georgia General
Assembly recommended establishing a program of tuition grants
"for the benefit of any child whose parent chooses to withdraw
said child from an integrated school." 50 The Georgia legislature
followed this recommendation, passing a law, still in the Code,
authorizing tuition payments to private schools. 51 Georgia also
authorizes lease of school property to private institutions. 52 This
law remains on the books, and in principle is entirely valid and
enforceable, even though in several instances Georgia school
districts were enjoined from selling public schools for use as private, segregated schools. 53
After Brown, many states authorized private school teachers to toin the pension program for public school teachers. Arkansas 4 and Virginia55 repealed their statutes in the 1980s, but
those of Alabama 56 and Georgia 57 remain in effect.
judge court) (permanently enjoining section), affd mem. per curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968).
50. Report of the Committee on Schools of the General Assembly of Georgia, reprinted in 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 509,516 (1961). See also Board of Pub. Educ. for the City
of Savannah and County of Chatham v. Georgia, 1992 WL 699499, *2 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 11,
1992) ("The repeal of these segregation laws did not signal the end of state resistance to
desegregation efforts. In 1961, the General Assembly provided tuition grants for students
who wished to attend private, segregated schools. Moreover, state officials offered to
provide legal services to local school boards that defended against desegregation suits");
OP. GA. ATIY. GEN. No. U93-8, *1 (Sept. 20, 1993) ("This statute was passed at a time
when the state legislature was enacting laws in an attempt to offset the impact of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and its progeny.").
51. GA. CODE ANN.§ 20-2-642 provides:
Every child between the ages of six and 19 years residing in this state who has
not finished or graduated from high school and who is otherwise eligible and
qualified to attend the elementary and secondary public schools of the local
school system wherein such child resides shall, in lieu of attending the public
schools of such local school system, be eligible to receive an education grant to
be expended for the purpose of paying or otherwise defraying the cost of tuition
at a nonsectarian private school located in any state of the United States or a
public school located outside this state but within some other state of the
United States, in the amount and manner provided by and subject to this article.
The full statute is contained in Sections 640 to 650. See also Lowe v. State, 482
S.E.2d 344 (Ga. 1997) (affirming denial of mandamus petition seeking to compel funding
of act).
52. GA. CODE ANN.§ 20-2-553(a)(5).
53. See, e.g., Wright v. Baker County Bd. of Educ., 501 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1974);
Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1972).
54. 1959 Ark. Acts No. 55,§§ 1, 2, codified at ARK. CODE ANN.§ 24-7-503 (1987),
repealed, 1987 Ark. Acts No.4, § 4.
55. 1956 Va. Laws Ch. 64, codified at VA. CODE § 22-188.3, VA. CODE § 51111.38:1, reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 1098-1100 (1956). Evidently, private school
participation stopped in 1983. Bradley v. Baliles 639 F. Supp. 680, 684 (E.D. Va. 1986),
affd sub nom. School Bd. of the City of Richmond v. Baliles, 829 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir.
1987).
56. ALA. STATS. ANN.§ 16-25-1(2) (teacher means "Any teacher, principal, super-
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E. "VOLUNTARY" SEGREGATION

The legal argument that the states had retained sovereignty
to "interpose" their authority against Supreme Court decisions
they disagreed with was popular in the Southern states but made
no headway in federal court. 58 Another theory had slightly more
respectability, namely, that perhaps Brown meant that enforced
segregation was unconstitutional, but voluntary segregation was
perfectly acceptable. 59
The Alabama Constitution contains a provision, adopted
two years after Brown, authorizing "the parents or guardians of
minors, who desire that such minors shall attend schools provided for their own race, to make election to that end." Needless
to say, the governmental purpose was exclusively benign, "[t]o
avoid confusion and disorder and to promote effective and economical planning for education." 60 Although the Supreme Court
held a provision of this type unconstitutional in 1963,61 the
amendment remains part of Alabama's fundamental law.

intendent, supervisor, college professor, administrative officer, or clerk employed in any
public school or public college within the state or employed in any private nondenominational school operated nonprofit for the education of children of school age residing
within a district where no public school is available for the children"). The expanded
definition was added by 1957 Ala. Acts 747, § 1 (Act No. 532).
57. GA. CODE ANN.§ 47-3-64 ("Any teacher or school employee who is employed
in a public school, who is covered by laws relating to a retirement fund or pension system
maintained by any county, city, or independent school district in this state or the board of
education thereof, and who accepts employment in a nonsectarian private school in this
state attended by students who arc eligible for grants from the state shall continue to be
subject to such retirement fund or pension system and shall be entitled to all of its benefits, provided that he makes or causes to be made to such retirement fund or pension system the contributions required of and for the benefit of such teacher or school employee
had he continued employment in the public schools.").
58. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
59. See Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) ("Nothing in the
Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend. The Constitution, in other words, docs not require integration. It merely forbids discrimination. It docs not forbid such segregation as
occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the usc of governmental power
to enforce segregation."). Briggs was one of the four cases consolidated in Brown itself;
this was the decision on remand. Although quite influential in the late 1950s and early
1960s, the so-called "Briggs dictum" was definitively rejected. See, e.g., Keyes v. Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 200 n.11 (1973) (noting that Briggs approach was rejected in
earlier Supreme Court cases).
60. ALA. CONST. amend. 111.
61. Goss v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
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F. PUPIL ASSIGNMENT LAWS.

The so-called "pupil assignment laws" were another method
of frustrating integration. 62 In 1962, the U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights reported that "[t)he pupil assignment acts have been
the principal obstacle to desegregation in the South. Essentially,
these laws authorize either the State or local authorities to assign
pupils individually to various schools. " 63 As one federal judge
explained, in upholding the state's right to assign pupils, they
could be used for benign purposes:
Without purposely and intentionally discriminating between
the races you may for any good cause or reason assign pupils
to schools other than that nearest to them. Thus, to illustrate,
if some pampered white boy, growing up without ever having
been controlled or denied, enters an integrated school and by
reason of his selfish propensities, pride or vanity or racial dislike creates disturbance he may be transferred to another
school. Likewise, if an overgrown Negro boy in an integrated
school should be by premature growth inclined to sex and
should write verses on the blackboard of an obscene character
designedly for the white girls to read or should make improper approaches to them so as to provoke trouble in the
school, he should be assigned to a school where the situation
is different. 64

Some states expressly repealed their puEil assignment statutes as they began to comply with Brown; 5 Louisiana's code
substituted a non-discrimination provision for its pupil assignment statutes in 1970.66 However, Mississippi67 and Tennessee 68

62. See Gerald Nathan Daffner, Note, The Effect of Pupil Placement Laws Upon
Southern Education, 23 ALB. L. REV. 376 (1959); Phillip J. Campanella, Note, 16 W. RES.
L. REV. 800 (1965); Note, State Efforts to Circumvent Desegregation, Private Schools, Pupil Placement and Geographic Segregation, 54 Nw. U. L. REV. 354 (1959); see also Daniel
1. Meador, The Constitution and the Assignment of Pupils to Public Schools, 45 VA. L.
REV. 517 (1959).
63. U.S. COMMISSI0:--1 ON CiVIL RIGHTS, CiVIL RIGHTS U.S.A. 2 (1962). "A major
purpose in the utilization or these pupil placement laws apparently is to secure the advantage or the legal doctrine related to the requirement that a person must normally exhaust
his administrative remedies before he goes into a federal court seeking relief against action taken by state orricials." Race Relations Law Survey, May, 1954-May, 1957, 2 RACE
REL. L. REP. 881,889 (1957).
64. Borders v. Rippey, 184 F. Supp. 402,420 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
65. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-301-6-18-305 (found to have been used to promote
segregation in Norwood v. Tucker, 287 F.2d 798 (8th Cir. 1961)), repealed by 1989 Ark.
Acts No. 950, § 1; FLA. STAT. AN;-.;.§ 230.232 (round to have been used to promote segregation in Augustus v. Board of Public Instruction of Escambia County, Fla., 306 F.2d
862 (5th Cir. 1962)), repealed by 1994 Fla. Laws c. 94-232, § 49.
66. LA. REv. STAT.§ 17:111 (added by 1970 La. Acts, Ex.Sess., No. I,§§ I, 2).
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retain pupil assignment statutes on the books. Federal courts
have recognized that both statutes were passed to defend segregation. In a case involving the Jackson public schools, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the defense argument for dismissal on the
ground that any segregation in the school system was voluntary.
The premise for this theory is that any segregation in these
school systems is purely voluntary in light of the Mississippi
Pupil Assignment Statute, ... Mississippi Laws 1954, Chapter
260; and that appellants cannot be heard to say to the contrary without at least applying for assignment to schools being
attended by members of the white race. This is particularly so,
the argument goes, in view of the absence of compulsory
school attendance laws in Mississippi and the resulting necessity to apply for admission and assignment annually. This
premise is buttressed by a line of authorities that require exhaustion of administrative remedies, and denial of constitutional ri~hts to appellants individually before relief may be
granted.

Given the state statutes re~uiring segregation, the court found
this argument unpersuasive. ° Federal courts in Tennessee also
rejected the argument. 71
G. OTHER ASPECTS OF SCHOOL SEGREGATION
Other state laws also contemplate segregation. The Mississippi Code provides for "a 4-H Club demonstration camp for
Negro 4-H Club members;" "this facility may be rented to other
Negro organizations for educational and recreational use
only." 72 West Virginia law limits the number of "negro" assistant

67. MISS. CODE ANN.§§ 37-15-13 et seq. (added by 1954 Miss. Laws Ch. 260, § 1).
68. TENN. CODE ANN.* 49-6-3102 et seq. (added by 1957 Tenn. Pub. Acts, c. 13).
69. Evers v. Jackson Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 328 F.2d 408,409 (5th Cir. 1964).
70. /d. See also Montgomery v. Starkville Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 665 F. Supp.
487, 490 & n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (noting that many communities "refused to desegregate
their schools in any meaningful way"; in Mississippi, this was initially accomplished
through a "freedom of choice" plan in the form of the "Mississippi Pupil Assignment
Statute"), affd, 854 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1988).
71. See, e.g., Monroe v. Bd. of Com'rs of the City of Jackson, 391 U.S. 450, 453
(1968) (noting that Tennessee's pupil placement act had been held to be an inadequate
means of complying with Brown (citing Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Memphis,
302 F.2d 818, 821 (6th Cir. 1962)); Kelly v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Nashville, 159 F. Supp.
272,275 (M.D. Tenn. 1958) (denying motion to dismiss desegregation action "based upon
the provisions of the Pupil Assignment Act").
72. MISS. CODE ANN. * 37-113-31. See generally Wade v. Miss. Co-Operative Extension, 372 F. Supp. 126 (N.D. Miss), supplemented, 378 F. Supp. 1751 (N.D. Miss.
1974), affd in part, reversed in part, 528 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1976).
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school superintendents to one per county, and only in counties
73
where "fifty or more negro teachers are employed." A Missouri statute regulates the supervision of persons paroled from
74
the "State Training School for Negro Girls."
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. JIM CROW'S BREADTH
The continued existence of these fragments of Jim Crow reveals the breadth and depth of segregation. Although some of
them betray their motives in their text, others are known to be
part of Jim Crow only because of history provided by court decisions or other sources. The facially neutral nature of these statutes aimed at promoting racial discrimination raises the possibility that other facially neutral laws were passed to disadvantage
African Americans. The surviving Jim Crow statutes are also
remarkable for their wide scope-not only schools were segregated, but also 4-H Clubs, and even prisons.
B. WHEN DID JIM CROW END?

Unlike some legal regimes, Jim Crow did not end with a disjuncture; there was no single moment of structural change, even
as a matter of constitutional doctrine. A state adopting the Uniform Commercial Code, for example, must consciously and deliberately account for the fact that many other parts of the state's
common law and statutory code will have to be amended, altered or repealed to accommodate the new legal structure. 75 The
decades-long struggle for precision about the nature of the
states' obligations to desegregate schools, and the decades-long
success of the states' shifting legal response, illustrates that there
was never a revelation explicitly declaring Jim Crow illegal in all
its forms and advising state actors what to do about it going forward. Instead, Jim Crow trailed off, fading away over a period of
decades as the courts and Congress defined the obligations of
the law, case by case, detail by detail.
To be sure, Brown itself was a landmark. It has been called
"the most important political, social and legal event in America's
73.
74.
75.
(2002).

W. VA. CODE § 18-5-32.
Mo. REV. STAT.§ 205.900(1).
See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789
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twentieth-century history." 76 But as a matter of legal doctrine, its
centrality is far more apparent in retrospect than it was at the
time. Brown gave rise to a series of decisions striking down various aspects of Jim Crow, but many were per curiam summary
dispositions without opinion, and the line took a full decade to
ripen into a general principle against racial discrimination. 77 As
late as 1965, a unanimous Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld an
anti-miscegenation law; it reported: "The great weight of authority from both federal and state courts is that they are constitutional."78 In 1971, the Supreme Court held that Jackson, Mississippi could choose to close its public swimming facilities rather
than operate them on an integrated basis. 79 Even now, it is not
clear that the Supreme Court understands the Constitution to
require, say that "all branches and all levels of government must
exercise their powers to eliminate the vestiges of unlawful racial
discrimination to the maximum possible extent with the maximum possible speed." 8° For example, unless they were set aside
at the time, criminal convictions rendered by juries from which
African Americans were unconstitutionally excluded are perfectly valid, and can be used to justify incarceration or enhanced
punishment today. 81
Indeed, as Brown marked the commencement of a new epoch in constitutional law, it also gave rise to the classic example
of the consequences of ambiguous exposition of law, namely the
Supreme Court's 1955 pronouncement that desegregation was to
be pursued "with all deliberate speed. " 82 Fourteen years later,
76. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT
AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION, 1954-1978 at 6 (1979).
77. Goss v. Bd. of Ed. of the City of Knoxville, 373 U.S. 683,687 (1963) ("The cases
of this Court reflect a variety of instances in which racial classifications have been held to
be invalid"); Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213, 247 (1991) ("Brown's narrow rationale left unresolved the constitutionality of segregation in contexts less fundamental than education-that is, most areas
of life."). In 1957, the Race Relations Law Reporter explained that "No other court decision in this century has had comparable repercussions," but "[w]hcther the principle will
be considered broad enough to invalidate as unconstitutional any racial distinction based
on law or supported by government authority remains to be determined." Race Relations
Law Survey, May, 1954-May, 1957,2 RACE REL. L. REP. 881,881 (1957).
78. Jones v. Lorenzen, 441 P.2d 986,989 (Okla. 1965).
79. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
80. Professors Canon and Johnson offer a valuable model for understanding the
implementation of judicial decisions. See BRADLEY C. CANON & CHARLES A. JOHNSON,
JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT (2d ed. 1998). They note that
"whether a higher court decision or policy goal is clearly and consistently articulated will
have a substantial effect on lower court interpretations." /d. at 49.
81. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986).
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
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some jurisdictions had not begun to comply. 83 Although there is
no excuse for the delay, caused by recalcitrance rather than the
difficulty of good faith efforts to obey the law, desegregation of
public education was a genuinely large and complex problem.
Yet, even with respect to far more discrete legal issues, the
course of reform has resulted in clear rules only over long periods of time.
Racially restrictive property covenants illustrate the ambiguous development of legal doctrine. Perhaps the first federal
case involving a restrictive covenant struck it down; in Gandolfo
v. Hartman, an 1892 decision, the Circuit Court held the covenant judicially unenforceable in an opinion implying that it was
entirely invalid. 84 In Corrigan v. Buckley, decided in 1926, the
Supreme Court seemed to hold that restrictive covenants were
enforceable in equity as mere "contracts entered into by private
individuals." 85 In 1948, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 86 the Court denied
that it reached the merits in Corrigan, 87 and concluded that equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant would violate equal
protection. However, they explained, "[s]o long as the purposes
of these agreements are effectuated by voluntary adherence to
their terms, it would appear clear that there has been no action
by the State and the provisions of the [Fourteenth] Amendment
have not been violated." 88 Five years later, in Barrows v. Jackson, 89 the Court held unconstitutional the award of money damages for violation of a covenant; Chief Justice Vinson, Shelley's
author, dissented.

83. See Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218 (1969) (Black,
Circuit Justice) (denying stay).
84. Gandolfo v. Hartman, 49 F. 181, 182 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1892) ("Any result inhibited by the constitution can no more be accomplished by contract of individual citizens
than by legislation, and the courts should no more enforce the one than the other.").
85. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331 (1926).
86. 334 u.s. 1 (1948).
87. !d. at 7 ("Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or
color is a question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider.").
But see, e.g., Mays v. Burgess, 147 F.2d 869, 870 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (after discussing circuit
and Supreme Court affirmance in Corrigan, concluding "in view of the consistent adjudications by this court that a covenant against Negro ownership or occupation is valid and
enforceable in equity by way of injunction, it must now be conceded to be the settled law
in this jurisdiction."); Doherty v. Rice, 3 N.W.2d 734, 737 (Wis. 1942) (rejecting challenge
to judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants; Corrigan "must be taken as finally settling that question").
88. 334 U.S. at 13.
89. 346 u.s. 249 (1953).
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the mainstream legal profession apparently regarded racially restrictive covenants as perfectly permissible. In 1966, the West Publishing Compan~ published the
volume of Modern Legal Forms covering deeds, 0 edited by Edmund 0. Belsheim, a distinguished educator who received his
legal education at Oxford and Chicago, and among other highlights of a long legal career held regular appointments at the law
schools of Virginia, Tennessee, Nebraska (where he served as
dean), and Lewis and Clark (where a chair is named in his
honor). 91 All evidence suggests that he was a respecter of constitutional rights as a general matter. 92
Nevertheless, the model covenants included those designed
to exclude nonwhites from use or occupancy of land. Deeds section 3342 provided that "This property shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except those of the Caucasian
race." 93 The next section prohibited sale or lease to "negroes,"
and ~rovided for "injunction, mandatory or other," and damages. 4 The text acknowledged that the covenants were unenforceable, but pointed out that "so long as the covenants are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment have not been violated. "95
The ironic last chapter is that restrictive covenants had been
illegal the whole time. In 1968, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
the Court held that even private discrimination in the sale or
rental of property violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982,96 and that the Congress had the authority to enact the law. 97 Section 1982 had been
in effect for a century, starting life as part of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866; Gandolfo v. Hartman had been rightly decided in 1892.

90. EDMUND 0. BELSHEIM, MODERN LEGAL FORMS (1966).
91. See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 1994-95 DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS 216 (1994).
92. Dean Bclsheim represented one of the ddcndants in the murders made famous
in Truman Capote's In Cold Blood. See Fugate v. Ronin, 91 N.W.2d 240, 241 (Ncb.
1958). He also signed an amicus brief in support of abortion rights. See 11 WOMEN'S'
RTS. L. REP. 213, 232 (1989). See generally Douglas K. Newell, Dedication Edmund 0.
Belsheim: Teacher, 25 ENVTL. L. xi (1995).
93. MODERN LEGAL FORMS, supra note 90, at88.
94. /d. at 88-89.
95. /d. at 88 n.77.
96. "All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real and personal property."
97. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (section
1982 applies to racially discriminatory private schools).
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Even with respect to this focused problem, the courts failed
to offer a clear message. Five decades of Supreme Court decisions left the status of restrictive covenants far murkier than
would have been ideal. If 18 years after Shelley and 14 years after Barrows Dean Belsheim could suggest to lawyers that they
draft racial covenants purporting to be enforceable by injunction
and damages, even after Jones, non-lawyers could hardly be expected to intuit that they were invalid. Accordingly, as recently
as 1998, Ohio passed a statute attempting to prevent unlawful
restrictive covenants from being included in deeds when they are
transferred; 98 five sections of the current Code of Federal Regulations are designed to ensure that veterans and others involved
in land transactions are reminded that restrictive covenants cannot be honored. 99
The full doctrinal implications of Brown may yet be unrealized. If there is one area where the Court's contemporary jurisprudence may remain in the middle of a false start, it is in the
area of criminal justice, where it has not understood the Constitution as requiring automatic invalidation of convictions resting
in part on racial factors. In 1987, the Court held that substantial
evidence of racial impact on the death penalty as a whole was legally irrelevant in the absence of evidence that a particular case
was affected by the discrimination affecting the system. 100 In
1996, the Court held that stops and searches motivated by racial
animus did not violate the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures" guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 101
The Court has recognized a theoretical right to challenge governmental actions under the Fourteenth Amendment on the
ground that they are racially selective, but they have set the bar
so high 102 that it is not clear that any litigant has ever satisfied it;

98. See 1998 Ohio Laws 83 (adding, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.§ 3953.29, prohibiting the inclusion of prohibited restrictive covenant).
99. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4514(g)(2) (2003) ("The applicant recognizes that any restrictive
covenant on the property relating to race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or
national origin is illegal and void and any such covenant is specifically disclaimed"); 38 C.F.R.
§ 36.4402(a)(5)(ii) (2003); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4363(d)(2) (2003); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4206(d)(2)(ii)
(2(XJ3); 24 C.F.R. § 203.30(b) (2003).
I 00. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
101. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). See Anthony C. Thompson,
Stopping The Usual Suspects: Race And The Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956
(1999).
102. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996). See generally Gabriel J. Chin,
Race, the War on Drugs and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J.
GENDER, RACE & JuST. 253, 266-67 (2002).
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there are apparently no reported decisions dismissing a prosecution as racially selective.
Even if none of this changes in the future, it is still the case
that the Court's criminal justice doctrine has not been consistent
in the post-Brown era. Once before, the Court revisited a decision failing to apply sufficient scrutiny to convictions employin&
the "corrosive category of race is a factor in decisionmaking." 1
In 1965, the Court upheld the right of prosecutors to challenge
prospective jurors on the basis of race; this decision was overruled after twenty years of trials and convictions by segregated
juries. 104 If well into the 1980s, intentional racial discrimination
was allowed in this central area of public life, it is not clear when
in the 1950s, 1960s, or 1970s, any legislature should have thought
the time had come to bury Jim Crow. By the 1980s and beyond,
legislators might have incorrectly but reasonably assumed that
Jim Crow had been purged by an earlier generation.
C. PURGING JIM CROW, ROOT AND BRANCH

In large part because of Jim Craw's gradual rather than
abrupt decline, even at the level of formal, written law there was
never a systematic, sustained effort to identify the scope of racial
discrimination and eliminate all of its manifestations. In Green v.
County School Bd. of New Kent County, Virginia, the Court explained that school boards in charge of segregated schools, and,
by extension, other responsible governmental officials, were required to ensure that "racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch." 105 With respect to the law itself, that never
happened.
To be sure, there have been landmark decisions and statutes
which had a great deal of impact, including Brown, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. But the
cases are brought by particular litigants raising specific legal
claims. Some meritorious cases are never brought or are mishandled. The cases present a partial picture of the scope of discrimination. Not every act of discrimination or law aimed at disadvantaging members of a particular race is matched by a
judicial decision invalidating it. Decisions establishing broad le-

103. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy J., dissenting).
104. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), overruled, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 ( 1986).
105. 391 U.S. 430,438 (1968).
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gal principles will not necessarily be complied with by every person and institution in the nation.
With respect to restrictive covenants, for example, the Jones
decision in 1968 hardly put African Americans on a level playing
field. The approval given by many courts before Shelley, and the
suggestion in Shelley and Barrows that privately enforced covenants were acceptable, affected decades of transactions in a
country where ownership of real property is a primary avenue of
acquiring wealth. The covenants also remained in countless
documents which would affect future transactions. These covenants did not disappear simply because the Court declared them
illegal in 1968; lawyers but especially non-lawyers reading the in
terrorem language of Modern Legal Forms might well feel constrained to honor them. 106
Legislation, no matter how broad, is restricted to a few discrete areas at most. Even the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, like most legislation, was prospective,
attempting to level the playing field with respect to transactions
in the future, but otherwise leaving the past as it is. 107
There have also been important reports and studies-the
Kerner Commission report, 108 Pauli Murray's State's Laws on
Race and Color, 109 the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights' 50
States Report. 110 But these have been limited in time, geography
or in other ways.
I 06. See Richard Brooks, Covenants and Conventions (work in progress 2002), available at http://www.papcrs.ssrn.com/sol3/papcrs.cfm?abstract_id=353723 (noting continuing economic effects of unenforceable restrictive covenants). Thus the decision in Mayers
v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane) (per curiam), holding under the Fair
Housing Act that deeds with restrictive covenants should not be recorded or copied
without a disclaimer noting the invalidity of the restriction. But see Woodward v. Bowers,
630 F. Supp. 1205 (M.D. Pa. 1986). There were also a string of actions after Shelley seeking declarations that covenants were void. See, e.g., Capitol Fed. Sav & Loan, v. Smith,
316 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957) (granting declaration); Erickson v. Sunset Mcm'l Park Ass'n,
108 N.W.2d 434 (Minn. 1961) (granting declaration); Gas! v. Gorek, 211 N.Y.S.2d 112
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (denying declaration).
107. See, e.g., International Broth. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355
(1977) ("Congress in 1964 made clear that a seniority system is not unlawful because it
honors employees' existing rights, even where the employer has engaged in pre-Act discriminatory hiring or promotion practices."); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 761 (1976) (noting that a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 insulates employment seniority systems from challenge "as perpetuating the effects of discrimination occurring prior to the effective date of the Act.").
I 08. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
109. PAULI MURRAY, STATE'S LAWS ON RACE AND COLOR (1950) (Davison Douglased. 1997).
110. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 50 STATES REPORT (1961) (reprinting reports
of the state advisory committee's reports on local conditions.)
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Conceivably, some discrete forms of discrimination-a statute segregating public transportation, say-can be effectively
ended in isolation; once seating, service and routes are equalized, it may be that the discrimination is entirely a thing of the
past. With respect to a nation afflicted with decades of racial discrimination in many different forms, it is impossible to say with
confidence that racial discrimination has been remedied without
understanding its full scope. Take, for example, state support of
segre~ated private schools, which clearly violates the Constitution.1 1 Amendment 111 to the Alabama Constitution authorized
state creation and support of private schools:
The legislature may by law provide for or authorize the establishment and operation of schools by such persons, agencies
or municipalities, at such places, and upon such conditions as
it may prescribe, and for the grant or loan of public funds and
the lease, sale or donation of real or personal property to or
for the benefit of citizens of the state for educational purposes
under such circumstances and upon such conditions as it shall
prescribe. Real property owned by the state or any municipality shall not be donated for educational purposes except to
nonprofit charitable or eleemosynary corporations or associations organized under the laws of the state.

There are cases enjoining payments by Alabama to segregated private schools. 11 In 1974, the Supreme Court upheld an
injunction against Montgomery's support of private schools by
allowing them access to public recreation facilities. 113 However, a
Westlaw search reveals no cases challenging Amendment 111 itself, and none of the cases purport to calculate the entire amount
used to disadvantage African Americans. Perhaps the cases reflect that all of the support was discovered and squelched. On
the other hand, perhaps the cases represent the tip of the iceberg, and additional millions of funds or real property were put
into the hands of private schools for purposes of segregation, but
no one discovered it or had the wherewithal to initiate a lawsuit.
In any event, the laws and cases span three decades, therefore
holding out the possibility that a great deal of support was given
over a long period of time.
Ill. See supra note 44.
112. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 475-78 (M.D. Ala.) (three
judge court) (invalidating 1965-66 tuition grant laws), affd mem per curiam sub nom.
Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F.
Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (three judge court) (invalidating 1957 tuition grant laws).
113. Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
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Apart from concern about the magnitude and effect of past
transactions, there is reason to be skeptical that equal opportunity can be achieved by reforming individual features of the present system without addressing the situation as a whole. Among
the major areas of life where systematic governmental racial discrimination affected the prospects of individuals were employment, education, the criminal justice system, and housing. Because of their interdependence, even a fairly high level of nondiscrimination against a particular group with respect to three
out of the four may well not result in equal opportunities as a
whole for that group. An open door to the school house, fair
treatment in the criminal justice system and access to all housing
at market prices, for example, will not lead to fairness if there is
substantial employment discrimination. Discrimination in education can be debilitating even if there is non-discriminatory access
to housing and jobs.
A handful of Supreme Court decisions recognize the interdependence of discrimination, and imply that it has constitutional significance. In Gaston County, North Carolina v. United
States, 114 a jurisdiction covered by the Voting Rights Act sought
to reinstate its literacy test, arguing that it did not discriminate
against prospective voters on the basis of race. The Court refused, because even neutral application of the literacy test would
perpetuate the effects of discrimination in other areas.
It is only reasonable to infer that among black children compelled to endure a segregated and inferior education, fewer
will achieve any given degree of literacy than will their bettereducated white contemporaries .... Affording today's Negro
youth equal educational opportunities will doubtless prepare
them to meet, on equal terms, whatever standards of literacy
are required when they reach voting age. It does nothing for
their parents, however. From this record, we cannot escape
the sad truth that throughout the years Gaston County systematically deprived its black citizens of the educational opportunities it granted to its white citizens. "Impartial" administration of the literacy test today would serve only to
perpetuate these inequities in a different form. 115

Similarly, in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 116 the Court invalidated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an intel-

114.
115.
116.

395 U.S. 285 (1969).
!d. at 295-97.
401 U.S. 424 (1971)
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ligence test which had a disproportionate impact against African
Americans. It explained: "If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited." 117 The Court relied in
part on the fact that "petitioners have long received inferior
education in segregated schools. " 118
CONCLUSION
Race consciousness was so deeply ingrained in many segments of American society that even judges felt comfortable using racial references in court. Favorite remarks included the
phrase "n***** in the woodpile," 119 rep,laced in a more enlightened era by "negro in the woodpile." 12 Those with untenable legal positions were said not even to have a "chinaman's
chance"; 121 sneak~ litigants were sometimes compared to the
"heathen chinee" 22 of Bret Harte's poem. 123 There is no reason

117. /d.at431,
118. /d. at 430. See also United States v. Texas Ed. Agency, 600 F.2d 518 (5th Cir.
1979); McNeal v. Tate County Sch. Dist., 508 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975).
119. See, e.g., White v. Bd. of Adjustment of the City of Birmingham, 15 So. 2d 585,
589 (Ala. 1943) (Brown 1., dissenting) ("There is, however, a 'n***** in the wood pile,'
as appears from the evidence in this case-appellant has on her property a servant's
house in which negroes, who serve people in this residence, live.") (asterisks added);
Baker v.J.C. Watson Co., 134 P.2d 613,624 (Idaho 1943); Dillard v. State, 73 So. 799, 799
(Miss. 1917); see also In re Agresta, 476 N.E.2d 285 (N.Y. 1985) (upholding discipline of
judge for using phrase).
120. See, e.g., Yellow Cab Operating Co. v. Taxicab Drivers Local Union No. 889,35
F. Supp. 403,408 (W.O. Okla. 1940) (noting that one subject of labor dispute was "a colored boy, James Criss" "while he may not be considered exactly 'the negro in the woodpile', is the 'fly in the ointment.'"), rev'd, 123 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1941); Johnson v. State,
182 P.2d 777, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947); see also State v. Whittaker, 94 So. 144, 145
(La. 1922) ("The judge a quo, instead of being impressed in this case with the suggestion
that there was 'an***** in the woods,' evidently accepted, as a fact, that there was 'a negro in the woodpile.'") (asterisks added).
121. See, e.g., Belser v. CIR, 174 F.2d 386,390 (4th Cir. 1947) (noting that there was
•·no likelihood (not even a modicum of a Chinaman's chance) that he would ever realize
anything on these loans"); Commonwealth v. Savor, 119 A.2d 849, 854 (Pa. Super.) (Ross
J., dissenting) ("From the moment the jury learned that he had a penitentiary record,
he-guilty or innocent-didn't have a 'CHINAMAN'S CHANCE' OF ESCAPING
CONVICTION. In other words he, in my judgment, did not have a fair trial."), affd, 120
A.2d 444 (Pa. 1956); State v. Hensley, 1991 WL 207840, *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991),
rev'd sub nom. State v. Hargrove, 1993 WL 300759 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Rhodes, 543
N.W.2d 867 (1995) (counsel "decided not to pursue the suppression motion because
there was not 'a Chinaman's chance that the statement would be suppressed.' Counsel
was correct."). See also Chun Kock Quon v. Proctor, 92 F.2d 326, 329 (9th Cir. 1937)
("When federal officers mete out such treatment to a man previously established to be an
American citizen, we can well understand the bitter irony of the current phrase 'A
Chinaman's Chance"').
122. See, e.g., Farm Credit Admin. v. Burleigh, 26 F. Supp. 938, 939 (D. Or. 1938)
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to assume that a cultural feature this systematically entrenched
will disappear on its own, particularly from written law that can
124
only be changed through affirmative action.
Every state has a state university with professional historians, economists, and political scientists. Every state has a judicial

("Bret Harte's 'Heathen Chincc' could have taken a lesson'' from conduct of litigant),
rev'd, 110 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1940); Board of Supervisors of Monroe County v. State, 63
Miss. 135, 1885 WL 4886, *2 (Miss. 1885) ("When asked to pay out money, they must
answer like the 'heathen Chinee' to the drowning man, who cried to him to throw him a
rope: 'No have got-how can do?'"); Cook v. Newby, 112 S.W. 272, 278 (Mo. 1908);
Owens v. Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co., 175 S.E. 203,207 (N.C. 1934) (Clarkson J. dissenting); Ling v. Richfield Oil Co., 16 P.2d 643, 644 (Or. I 932) ("Brct Harte's 'heathen chinee' had nothing in 'ways that arc dark, and tricks that arc vain' on the devious method
by which the contractual relations between respondent and appellant were established.");
Pendar v. Kelley, 48 Vt. 27, 1875 WL 6622 (1875).
123. The poem is long, but the critical stanza is:
Which is why I remark,
And my language is plain,
That for ways that arc dark
And for tricks that arc vain,
The heathen Chince is peculiar, Which the same I am free to maintain.
Bret Harte, Plain Language from Truthful James, The Overland Monthly Magazine,
Sept., 1870, reprinted in BRET HARTE, THE HEATHEN CHINEE (1870), available at
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/railton/roughingit/map/chiharte.html.
124. The analysis of Justice Thomas in United States v. Fordice about the persistence
of bad intent is particularly trenchant:
It is safe to assume that a policy adopted during the de jure era, if it produces
segregative effects, reflects a discriminatory intent. As long as that intent remains, of course, such a policy cannot continue. And given an initially tainted
policy, it is eminently reasonable to make the State bear the risk of nonpersuasion with respect to intent at some future time, both because the State has created the dispute through its own prior unlawful conduct, see, e.g., [Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1 of Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 209-210 (1973),] and because discriminatory intent docs lend to persist through time, see, e.g., Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309-310, n.l5 (1977). Although we
do not formulate our standard in terms of a burden shift with respect lo intent,
the factors we do consider-the historical background of the policy, the degree
of its adverse impact, and the plausibility of any justification asserted in its defense-arc precisely those factors that go into determining intent under Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (I 976). See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-267 (1977). Thus, if a policy
remains in force, without adequate justification and despite tainted roots and
segregative effect, it appears clear-clear enough to presume conclusively-that
the State has failed to disprove discriminatory intent.
505 U.S. 717, 746-47 (1992) (Thomas J., concurring). See also, e.g., Dcvah Pager, The
Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM.J. Soc. 937, 958 (2003) (describing experiment testing the results of job applications showing that "even whites with criminal records received more favorable treatment than blacks without criminal records.") (emphasis in
original); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable Then Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experimem on Labor Market Discrimination,
MIT Dept. of Econ. Working Paper 03-22 (May 27, 2003) available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=422902.
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system and most have law schools, 125 so legal experts will not be
hard to find. There are State Advisory Committees to the U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights in every state in the Union. 126 The
State Advisory Committees institutionally have decades of experience generating information about local conditions and experiences and writing reports about them.
All of these resources should be called upon to study the
structure of Jim Crow since the Civil War. Every state should
know whether, when and to what extent African Americans and
members of other races were excluded from public and private
housing, jobs, and education through the actions of the state, and
other ways in which race discrimination shaped the laws and activities of the government. Every state should know what was
done about that discrimination, through litigation, voluntary
changes in policy, or otherwise. Every state should attempt to
identify the laws and governmental structures shaped by racial
discrimination. Finally, every state should estimate the present
consequences of historical discrimination. Systematic and responsible generation of facts and information would allow discussion and legislation about race and justice in ways that are
now impossible.

125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 357-58 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that all but five states have public law schools).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 1975(a); 45 C.F.R. §§ 703.1-703.10.

